The authors assessed the ability of 6 captive dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) to comprehend without explicit training 3 human communicative signs (pointing, directed gaze, and replica). Pointing consisted of indicating the target item with the index finger and a fully extended arm. Directed gaze consisted of orienting the head and eyes toward the target item while the rest of the body remained stationary. The replica signal consisted of holding up an exact duplicate of the target item. On the initial series of 12 trials for each condition, 3 dolphins performed above chance on pointing, 2 on gaze, and none for replica. With additional trials, above chance performance increased to 4 dolphins for pointing, 6 for gazing, and 2 for replica. The replica sign seemed to be the most taxing for them (only 2 dolphins achieved results significantly above chance). Taken together, these results indicate that dolphins are able to interpret untrained communicative signs successfully.
unclear (Ristau & Robbins, 1982; Terrace, Petitto, Sanders, & Bever, 1979) .
Less is known, however, about the spontaneous comprehension of communicative signs in animals. Unlike symbols, signals are not completely arbitrary but bear some morphological or iconic resemblance to the actions or objects that they represent. In many cases, these communicative signals are simply noncommunicative behaviors that have acquired a communicative function during ontogeny. For instance, a child's raising of the arms to be picked up probably develops from earlier attempts at climbing onto adults because adults respond appropriately when they understand what children are trying to accomplish. Likewise, little is known about the spontaneous comprehension of novel communicative signs (i.e., acquisition without the benefit of extensive training regimes). Spontaneous comprehension is particularly interesting because the quick acquisition of novel communicative signs can reveal a great deal about the level of understanding that recipients have of the behavior of communicators. In other words, spontaneous comprehension may reveal whether animals interpret the behavior of signalers as communicative in nature.
There are a handful of researchers who have investigated the spontaneous comprehension of human communicative signs in animals. Two behaviors have received special attention: pointing and gaze direction. A number of studies have shown that several primates are capable of responding spontaneously to proximal (finger approximately 10 cm from the target) pointing to find hidden food (Itakura & Tanaka, 1998; Peignot & Anderson, 1999) . Furthermore, another set of studies has shown that subjects that do not spontaneously respond to pointing can nevertheless be trained to use this cue to obtain food (Anderson, Montant, & Schmitt, 1996; Anderson, Sallaberry, & Barbier, 1995; Itakura & Anderson, 100 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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1996; Povinelli, Bierschwale, & Cech, 1999) . However, it is unclear whether comprehension of proximal pointing or comprehension after extensive training is related to the understanding of the referential nature of those signals. Povinelli, Reaux, Bierschwale, Allain, and Simon (1997) argued that unlike children, chimpanzees do not comprehend the referential nature of the pointing gesture, even though they can use this cue to locate hidden food. If those cases involving proximal pointing or extensive training are discounted, there are very few studies that have produced evidence of distal pointing comprehension in primates. Tomasello, Call, and Gluckman (1997) found that chimpanzees and orangutans, unlike children, failed to use distal pointing to select one of three baited boxes. Call and Tomasello (1994) investigated the ability of 2 orangutans to comprehend human pointing to locate hidden food. Although both orangutans were able to point to request food, only 1 of them was able to use human pointing to find food himself (and then only to a limited extent). Similarly, Hess, Novak, and Povinelli (1993) found that a macaque that pointed for caretakers failed to comprehend points directed at her. Nevertheless, Itakura (1996) found that several primates (notably 2 chimpanzees and 1 orangutan) followed distal pointing to locations above and behind themselves when there was no food hidden in any location.
By far the best evidence of pointing comprehension has been found among nonprimates. Several authors have found that dogs comprehended distal pointing to locate hidden food in various settings (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 1997; Hare & Tomasello, 1999; Mikl6si, Polgardi, Topal, & Cstoyi, 1998) . Recently, Herman et al. (1999) demonstrated that 2 dolphins were capable of following pointing to select one of three objects in their pool. Pointing was sometimes directed at objects that were situated behind the subject-a condition that is especially demanding for young human infants (Butterworth, 1991) .
Gaze following is the other communicative behavior that has been studied in some detail. There have been a number of studies showing that primates use the head and eye orientation of others to track locations above, behind, or to the side of the subject (Anderson & Mitchell, 1999; Emery, Lorincz, Perrett, & Oram, 1997; Itakura, 1996; Povinelli & Eddy, 1997; . However, this ability to follow gaze to various locations does not automatically transfer to object-choice situations in which subjects have to use the gaze as a cue to select the baited container out of a set several containers. Those species tested on this task performed poorly, although they could learn to use this cue after extensive training (Anderson et al., 1995 Call et al., 1998; Itakura & Anderson, 1996 ; but see Peignot & Anderson, 1999) . To date, it seems that only subjects that have had extensive contact with humans (i.e., enculturation) have shown the most consistent and spontaneous good performance using gaze in object-choice situations (Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Itakura, 1996; Itakura & Tanaka, 1998) .
Although in some of these studies subjects showed spontaneous (i.e., without specific training) point or gaze comprehension to locate rewards, it is unclear to what extent pointing and directed gaze were completely novel in these cases. It is very likely that subjects had ample opportunity to observe humans using pointing and humans and conspecifics using directed gaze. Tomasello et al. (1997) investigated the ability of chimpanzees, orangutans, and human children to comprehend novel communicative signs to find food located in one of three perceptually distinct boxes. The experimenter used one of the following signs to indicate the location of the reward to the subject: (a) pointing (placing the hand directly above the correct box with the index finger extended in the direction of the box); (b) marker (placing a wooden block on top of the correct box); and (c) replica (holding up an identical exemplar of the correct box). Children were able to use all three signs (note, however, that pointing was not novel for them), whereas all apes failed to do so unless they had learned to associate a particular sign (i.e., the marker) with the presence of food in a previous study. Those apes that had learned to use the marker to select the correct box in a previous study used this effectively, but unlike children, they did not use a human pointing gesture or a replica of the correct box to indicate the food location in subsequent trials.
In the present study, we investigated the ability of 6 captive dolphins to comprehend spontaneously (i.e., without explicit training) three communicative signs; the test required them to use the novel sign to select one of two objects located in their pool. We used three types of signs: pointing, head direction, and replica. Thus, in this study, we attempted both to replicate previous results on the ability of dolphins to use human pointing (Herman et al., 1999) and to extend to dolphins previous results obtained with primates and dogs in directed gaze and with children in the replica condition. Although it is very likely that the pointing and the directed gaze signs were not novel because trainers may have used them during their interactions with the dolphins, the replica sign was completely novel.
Method

Subjects
Serving as subjects were 3 female (Tombi, Khanya, and Affrika, 6, 6, and 5 years old, respectively) and 3 male (Kelpie, Kani, and Jula, 16, 10, and 9 years old, respectively) captive bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) at Sea World, Durban, South Africa. All dolphins were born at Sea World and lived in two separate groups (one for each sex). All dolphins were trained to perform in public shows in which they carried out specific tasks indicated by their trainers using a variety of hand signals. One of those hand signals was the fetch-object sign that instructed dolphins to retrieve objects from the pool. On seeing the fetch-object signal, all dolphins readily responded by retrieving any objects they might find inside the pool. Pointing or gazing was not used to indicate the object to be retrieved and was not one of the signs in their repertoire. In addition, neither pointing nor gazing was used to supplement the training of signs used by trainers during shows. All dolphins were trained to respond to all trainers, and trainers were discouraged from forming close bonds with particular dolphins. Instead, all trainers were encouraged to have good relationships with all dolphins. The dolphins' diet consisted of 18 to 12 kg of fish per day, depending on their age and size.
Materials
We used a ball and a hoop as the objects during the pretest. To prevent familiarity with the objects, we used a white container lid and a red bucket as objects during the test phase.
Procedure
Pretest. The dolphin was stationed at the poolside by the trainer. One of the items for retrieval, either the ball or the hoop, was placed in the water, and the command sign for fetch object was given. Successful This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
retrieval was rewarded with a fish. Dolphins were given as many trials as were needed to achieve 12 successive correct responses. Test. The dolphin was stationed at the poolside by the trainer, this position being held until the dolphin was orientated directly toward the trainer. The objects for retrieval, the bucket and lid, were placed at a distance of approximately 120 cm on either side of the dolphin. Assistants used rods to hold the objects in place to prevent movement in the water during the trial. To minimize potential cuing, assistants gazed directly forward in a disinterested manner while holding the objects in place. The dolphin was then given the signal for fetch object followed by one of three nonverbal gestural signs (point, gaze, or replica; see below); the dolphin indicated its choice by touching one of the objects. A correct response was rewarded with a fish and positive verbal encouragement by the trainer.
Three different gestural signals were used in the experiment. When giving the point signal, the trainer pointed with the index finger of her right hand with her arm fully extended, while her head and body remained facing forward. When giving the gaze signal, the trainer moved her head and eyes conspicuously toward the desired object, while the rest of her body remained stationary. The replica signal entailed the trainer holding up with her ipsilateral arm (i.e., the arm on the same side as the object) an exact duplicate of the desired item located in the water. In order to prevent gaze cuing, trainers wore sunglasses at all times except during gaze trials.
Each dolphin received at least 12 trials in each of the three conditions, for a minimum number of 36 test trials. In each case, the dolphin was given each of the three kinds of test trial in turn (e.g., replica-gaze-point), and the sequence was repeated until the requisite total number of trials had been achieved. Half of the dolphins (Affrika, Khanya, and Tombi) received the trials in the order replica-gaze-point, while the remaining dolphins (Kani, Kelpie, and Jula) received them in the order gaze-replica-point. All objects appeared the same number of times and were counterbalanced across trials for side (so that all objects appeared the same number of times to the left and to the right of the dolphin). Dolphins received additional trials when their performance was good but not significantly above chance. These extra trials served to clarify the outcome of the initial set of trials. For instance, if a dolphin succeeded in 8 of the initial 12 trials, additional trials were provided to see if the dolphin would continue performing at high levels. All trials were videotaped, and interobserver reliability was assessed by comparing the experimenter's scores with those of one independent observer on 22% of the trials. Interobserver reliability was excellent (Cohen's kappa = .81).
Results
All dolphins successfully completed 12 out of 12 correct trials in the pretest at the first attempt (binomial test: p < .05), except Khanya who required 18 trials to reach this criterion (Table 1) . Analysis of first-trial performance showed that 3 of the 6 dolphins succeeded on their first trial regardless of the condition. Four, 4, and 2 dolphins succeeded on their first trial of the gaze, point, and replica conditions, respectively. Analysis of error rates across consecutive blocks of trials (all three tests pooled) suggests that error rates remained more or less constant over time (Figure  1) , ^(5, N = 290) = 4.11, p > .50, with expected values proportional to the total number of trials in each block, indicating that there was no learning effect. Similarly, when the data were analyzed separately for each condition (see Figure 2) , error rates did not differ significantly from a constant ratio across trials, gaze: 3, N = 95) = 0.51; pointing: ^(3, N = 91) = 0.89; replica: 4, N = 104) = 3.79; ps a .40. Although there did not appear to be group effects of learning over trials, some dolphins only reached significance after extended trials (3 dolphins in the gaze condition, 2 in the replica, and 1 in the pointing condition). Thus, this result raised the possibility that particular individuals in particular conditions learned throughout testing.
Discussion
The results of this study confirm and extend those obtained in an earlier study of dolphins by Herman et al. (1999) . In this case, we have been able to demonstrate that at least some dolphins are able to interpret human pointing and gaze direction signals without prior training: 5 of the 6 subjects did so (at least with extended trials) for gaze following, and 4 did so for pointing. It is true that our pointing task was simpler than that used by Herman et al. (1999) because their dolphins had to follow points to locations behind them (as opposed to in front as in the present study). However, we showed that dolphins were also able to use head direction to locate targets.
In addition, 2 dolphins demonstrated that they could correctly interpret the use of replicas to identify the target. This finding is 11/12* 10/18 (10/12*) 10/12* 13/18 (7/9) 11/17(8/9*) 13/18(11/12*) 11/12* 11/12* 11/12* 4/12 14/25 (7/9 in 18) 14/18* (677) 1/12 11/22(11/12*) 9/18 4/13 11/14* (9/10*) 12/25 (7/9 in 23)
.. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. consistent with the results of Herman, Pack, and Morrel-Samuels (1993) on dolphins' ability to perform matching to sample after only a few trials and without extensive training. However, unlike Herman et al. (1993) , who found spontaneous correct performance on the first trial in 1 dolphin, our 2 dolphins only performed above chance after a couple of dozen trials. One possibility is that our dolphins might have performed better if the stimuli had been presented in the auditory rather than the visual modality (Herman, 1986) . Alternatively, actions that involved some sort of conspicuous movement, especially directional movement, may have been more salient for the dolphins . This would explain the better performance on pointing and gaze compared with replica. Nevertheless, our dolphins seemed to perform better than any of the great apes tested by Tomasello et al. (1997) , even in the absence of formal training. It is very likely that dolphins may have been exposed to pointing and directed gaze by their human trainers before this experiment. However, neither signal was part of their standard public show repertoire, and they were not explicitly used during training. Hence, any learning that might have occurred through prior exposure was solely due to the dolphins' abilities to infer meaning from humans and not due to deliberate training by the humans. With data for all 6 dolphins pooled, sample sizes for each block are 24; 24; 24; 8 point, 16 gaze, 15 replica; 6, 7, 9; and 6, 0, 7 trials, respectively. All dolphins contributed to all blocks, except the last three blocks. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Two possible confounds could be identified. When indicating the correct choice with the replica signal, the trainers always held the replica in the ipsilateral hand; the dolphins might, therefore, have solved the replica problem simply by noting on which side the object was held (a form of pointing) rather than by recognizing the object itself. Although possible, the force of this explanation is reduced considerably by the fact that the trainers always used the ipsilateral hand; if the dolphins had been using pointing as a cue, they should have been able to perform at least as well on the replica trials as they did on the pointing trials, yet they obviously found the replica trials harder (mean error rates of 29% vs. 51%, respectively), x*(l, N = 195) = 9.06, p < .01. A second possible confound is suggested by the fact that when given the fetch-object sign and shown the replica, dolphins would sometimes try to get the actual object in the trainer's hand. One reason for the dolphins' poor performance on these trials might thus have been that they were confused by the presence of two exemplars.
Of the 6 dolphins, all but 1 achieved significant results (in some cases with extended series of trials) in at least two of the three test series (with Kelpie passing on all three); no test proved consistently difficult for all dolphins, however. Only 1 dolphin (Khanya) failed on all three tests: It is no doubt significant that Khanya was also the only dolphin who required more than 12 trials to achieve criterion on the pretest trials (Table 1) . Given this, Khanya's failure to interpret the novel signals correctly is perhaps understandable.
Taken together, these results show that dolphins spontaneously comprehended two of the three signs. This suggests that dolphins were able to extract the communicative meaning of human signals spontaneously. Their success in the replica condition-a completely novel sign-after only a few trials reinforces this idea. Our results compare favorably with those obtained in most nonhuman primates and show that dolphins' performance was similar to that of dogs tested in comparable situations. The similarity between dogs and dolphins is intriguing, especially given that most nonhuman primates do not perform too well in these tasks. One likely explanation for dogs' ability to solve these tasks is that dogs have been selectively bred by humans to carry out certain tasks, many of which require them to be able to closely monitor and interpret the meaning of human communicative signals. Therefore, dogs' good performance in these tasks is not entirely unexpected. On the other hand, dolphins' ability to attend to humans and make sense of their behavior is a bit more puzzling. An obvious possibility is that dolphins are capable of rerouting their cognitive resources used for communication with conspecifics to read and predict human behavior, and in particular, human communicative behavior. In the future, researchers will need to address the extent of these apparent similarities between dogs and dolphins (and humans) as well as the evolution of the cognitive mechanisms that enabled the manifestation of these skills. One intriguing possibility is that various species may be capable of solving the same sorts of problems using different cognitive mechanisms.
